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I. INTRODUCTION
To prepare for his first triathlon, Brett Matherne, a Louisiana college student,
purchased a bicycle complete with toe clips.' While the manual provided vague
instructions for riders to release the straps prior to stopping the bicycle, Matherne
2
struggled to properly use the clips as a novice and fell several times. In order to
remove his foot more quickly when stopping, Matherne grew accustomed to
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law to be conferred May 2011; B.A. Legal
Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, 2007. The author is grateful to Professor Michael P. Malloy and
the McGeorge Law Review staff for their contributions to this Comment.
1. Matherne v. Poutrait-Morin/Zefal-Christophe, Todson, Inc., 2002-2136 (La. App. I Cir. 12/12/03);
868 So. 2d 114,115.
A toe clip is a thin metal cage attached to each pedal that holds the toe of a cyclist's shoe together
with an adjustable leather strap that goes over the instep of the cyclist's foot. The toe clip is designed
so that when the leather strap is manually tightened, the cyclist's foot will be securely fastened to the
pedal. In order to get the foot off of the pedal, the strap must be manually loosened.
Id. at n.1.
2. Id. at 120.
419
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riding with one of his toe straps significantly looser than the other.! Seven years
later, this method proved detrimental when Matherne suffered severe injuries
resulting from a collision with another bicycle.4 During a race, Matherne's front
tire clipped the back tire of the racer in front of him.s Unable to remove his foot
quickly enough to detach from the bike, he was drug along the bike's skid path.'
When Matherne sued the bike manufacturer for failing to warn him of the
danger of riding with the toe clips unstrapped, the court dismissed his claim on
the ground that he was a sophisticated cyclist.' Applying Louisiana's approach to
the sophisticated user doctrine, which defines "sophistication" as having actual
knowledge of the danger, the court reasoned that Matherne had significant
personal experience with the toe clips due to his seven years of cycling and his
testimony that he had fallen several times while learning how to use the them.'
Countless sports and innumerable other hobbies are common endeavors for
modem day Americans.' There is plausible doubt that a recreational cyclist, like
Matherne, would ever contemplate whether involvement with recreational sports
would someday preclude him or her from bringing suit against the manufacturer
or supplier of necessary equipment.'o If Louisiana defined "sophistication"
differently, perhaps by focusing on professional experience, Matheme may not
been classified as a sophisticated user." Thus, even subtle differences in each
jurisdiction's definition of "sophistication" will have a dramatic impact on who is
able to recover from product related injuries. 2
In 2008, the California Supreme Court formally adopted the sophisticated
user defense. Although the doctrine appears straightforward, other state and
federal courts have not all adopted the same model of the doctrine.14 Because
3. Id. at 116.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 120.
8. Id. at 121.
9. U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1212: Participation in Selected Sports Activities (2007), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/ 10sl212.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2010) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
10. Matherne, 868 So.2d at 115.
11. See Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2003 WI App 192, 266 is. -2d 970, 669 N.W.2d 737, 744-46
(holding that plaintiffs status as a professional sand foundry precluded them from bringing suit against supplier
under the sophisticated user doctrine).
12. See infra Part HI-IV.
13. Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905 (Cal. 2008).
14. See, e.g., Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1976)
(precluding a manufacturer's duty to warn sophisticated users "of dangers of which the buyer either knows or
should be aware."); Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331 (defining a
sophisticated user as someone who is familiar with the product and its potential dangers); Pavlides v. Galveston
Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1984) (examining the manufacturer's marketing practices in
determining user sophistication); Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1980)
(describing limitation of the sophisticated user defense to tradespeople or professionals only); Lockett v.
420
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applicability of the defense turns on whether the plaintiff is a sophisticated user,
the definition of sophistication is the crux of the defense." Some courts have
addressed this potential ambiguity by limiting the defense to professionals and
members of trades. 6 Other courts have crafted models of the defense that give
less deference to the plaintiffs professional capacities, instead focusing on
elements such as the group of purchasers targeted by the manufacturer." Despite
the prevalence of these different definitions, the California Supreme Court
provided little guidance regarding whether the defense will apply to professionals
and members of trades exclusively, or whether it will include laypersons as
well."
Fortunately, the Court specified three policy objectives that aided the
decision for adopting the defense in California.'9 In sum, these goals include: (1)
a desire to prevent those plaintiffs who have prior notice of the danger from suing
manufacturers for their injuries; (2) filtering out plaintiffs who have elevated
obviousness of the danger as a result of their individual experience with the
product; and (3) reducing manufacturer liability in order to prevent the
20detrimental proliferation of over-warning. Using these policy goals as
guideposts may be helpful for predicting how this defense may develop in the
future. 2' This Comment surveys the various approaches other jurisdictions have
adopted for defining user sophistication and recommends that California adopt
the familiarity approach in light of these three policy reasons.
Part II of this article discusses section 388 of the Restatement, which
provides the theoretical underpinnings of the defense.22 Part III presents an
overview of Johnson v. American Standard, Inc.3 and highlights portions of the
opinion that create uncertainty regarding how the defense should be applied in
California. Also, this Comment explores the three policy goals identified by the
court for adopting the sophisticated user defense. Part IV offers a survey of four
approaches from other jurisdictions that have adopted different ways of defining
user sophistication: the "should have known" model;2 4 the professional
General Electric Co., 376 F.Supp. 1201 (E.D.Pa.1974) (determining user sophistication based on whether the
knowledge of the user is equal to that of the supplier).
15. See infra Part IU.B.
16. Billiar, 623 F.2d at 243.
17. Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 330.
18. See infra Part LH.B.
19. See generally Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905 (Cal. 2008) (adopting the
sophisticated user defense in California).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
23. 179 P.3d 905.
24. See Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1976)
(precluding a manufacturer's duty to warn sophisticated users "of dangers of which the buyer either knows or
should be aware.").
421
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considerations model;25 the targeted marketing model;16 and the familiarity
model.2 ' Finally, Part V assesses the suitability of each approach in light of
Johnson's three policy goals, and ultimately chooses the familiarity approach as
the best model of the sophisticated user defense for California.
II. THE FOUNTAINHEAD
A popular starting point for several jurisdictions' approach to the
28
sophisticated user doctrine is section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
In general, this provision states that a supplier is subject to liability if the
supplier's knowledge regarding both the product and the intended user meets the
three requirements laid out in subdivisions (a) through (c).29 Under subdivision
(a), the user should know or have reason to believe that the product, when used
for its intended purpose, is dangerous or has the potential to become dangerous.
Setting aside subdivision (b) for a moment, subdivision (c) states that a supplier
must take reasonable care to inform the user of these inherent or potential
dangers."
Subdivision (b) provides the strongest influence in shaping the contours of
the sophisticated user defense.32 This provision exempts the supplier from
liability when the supplier "has no reason to believe that those for whose use the
[product] is supplied will realize its dangerous condition." 3 However, the
analytical roots of this defense run deepest in comment k. Entitled, "When
warning of defects unnecessary," it states that although the dangerous condition
may be readily observable, it still may not be readily apparent to persons of
special expertise.4 Under these conditions:
[I]f the supplier, having such special experience, knows that the
condition involves danger and has no reason to believe that those who
use it will have such special experience as will enable them to perceive
25. See Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing limitation of the
sophisticated user defense to tradespeople or professionals only).
26. See Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1984) (examining the
manufacturer's marketing practices in determining user sophistication).
27. See Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331 (defining a
sophisticated user as someone who is familiar with the product and its potential dangers).
28. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 911.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
30. Id. § 388, subdiv. (a).
31. Id. § 388, subdiv. (c).
32. Id. § 388, subdiv. (b).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 388, cmt. k.
422
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the danger, he is required to inform them of the risk of which he himself
knows and which he has no reason to suppose that they will realize.35
This specialized knowledge gives birth to a class of defendants who invoke the
sophisticated user defense by distinguishing the plaintiff from other users on the
basis that the plaintiffs knowledge about potential dangers is more sophisticated
than that of a layperson, who typically possesses little or no awareness of the
product's potential dangers.36
While section 388, subdivision (b), provides a strong basis for the
sophisticated user doctrine, comment k leaves open the important question of
determining who will qualify as someone with "special experience." Comment
k specifically references "persons of special experience," but the commentary to
section 388 fails to expand on who may fall into this special class of product
users, or to discuss how much experience is necessary to qualify as special
experience. These unanswered questions lurking in section 388's commentary
led to the proliferation of multifarious articulations of the sophisticated user
defense amidst courts, each proposing different contours to the ultimate shape of
the defense."
III. JOHNSON V. AMERICAN STANDARD, INC.
A. Making it Official
In Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., the plaintiff, William Keith Johnson,
was a certified heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) technician who
had received extensive training, including an Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) universal certification.40 This is the highest level of certification offered by
the EPA to HVAC technicians, allowing certified individuals to purchase and
work with refrigerant for commercial air conditioning systems.4' In his claim,
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. See id. (describing the basic framework of the sophisticated user doctrine).
37. Id.
38. See id. (discussing "persons of special experience" without providing a definition of these persons or
examples of who would fall within this category).
39. See, e.g., Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1976)
(precluding a manufacturer's duty to warn sophisticated users "of dangers of which the buyer either knows or
should be aware."); Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331 (defining a
sophisticated user as someone who is familiar with the product and its potential dangers); Pavlides v. Galveston
Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1984) (examining the manufacturer's marketing practices in
determining user sophistication); Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1980)
(describing limitation of the sophisticated user defense to tradespeople or professionals only); Lockett v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (determining user sophistication based on whether the knowledge
of the user is equal to that of the supplier).
40. 179 P.3d 905, 908 (Cal. 2008).
41. Id. Such extensive training is necessary because "[1]arge air conditioning systems commonly use R-
22, a hydrochlorofluorocarbon refrigerant ... that can decompose into phosgene gas when exposed to flame or
423
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Johnson alleged that he developed pulmonary fibrosis from being exposed to R-
22, which is produced when refrigerant lines are brazed.42 More specifically, he
argued the defendant was obligated to warn him of the dangers in using heat or
flame near hydro-chlorofluorocarbon refrigerant and the failure to satisfy this
duty to warn was the direct cause of his ailment.43
In affirming the Court of Appeal's holding, the California Supreme Court
laid out its interpretation of the sophisticated user defense," concluding that
manufacturers shall not be liable for failing to warn sophisticated users of
dangers the user knew or should have known.45 The court explained that
"individuals who represent that they are trained or are members of a sophisticated
group of users are saying to the world that they possess the level of knowledge
and skill associated with that class"" and "[i]f they do not actually possess that
knowledge or skill" because, for example, they "misread their training manuals,
failed to study . . . or simply [forgot] what they were taught",4 7 the actual lack of
their knowledge "should not give rise to liability on the part of the
manufacturer." 48
In discussing the sophisticated user doctrine, the court listed three theories, or
goals, that supported their decision to adopt the defense in California: the
causation theory of the defense; the elevated obviousness theory of section 388;
and a public policy reason regarding how to achieve optimal effectiveness of
safety warnings.49
The causation theory of the defense stems from the overall purpose of the
sophisticated user doctrine, which is to "inform consumers about a product's
hazards and faults of which they are unaware, so that they can refrain from using
the product altogether or evade the danger by careful use."o More specifically,
the court reasoned that a sophisticated user who is already aware of the product's
dangers has prior notice of the danger, and therefore cannot claim that the
manufacturer's failure to warn of the danger was the proximate cause of the
harm.5'
high heat, as could happen while a technician is brazing air conditioner pipes containing residual refrigerant."
Inhaling phosgene gas can lead to serious health problems. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 909.
44. Id. at 911.
45. Id. at 914.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 911 (Cal. 2008) (discussing the policy
reasons for adopting the sophisticated user defense in California).
50. Id.at9lO.
51. Id. at 905 (quoting Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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Second, the court paid a great deal of attention to section 388 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and its relation to the obvious danger rule.52
According to section 388, while some aspects of the product's danger may not be
obvious to the average user, those dangers will be obvious to the expert user,
thereby negating the manufacturer's duty to warn those sophisticated
individuals." Johnson adopted this defense due to its ability to target those
sophisticated individuals to whom the product's dangers are more readily
apparent.- In essence, section 388 describes the sophisticated user defense as
accounting for the heightened degree of product danger that some individuals
will be able to identify based on their prior experience or familiarity with the
product."
Finally, the court touched on a public policy theory for adopting the
sophisticated user defense. Without the sophisticated user defense,
manufacturers would be required to warn product users about nearly every aspect
of the product's danger." This practice would be extremely burdensome for
manufacturers and would result in mass consumer disregard of product
warnings." Furthermore, the court stated that while manufacturers must bear the
responsibility for any harm caused to the unknowing user, manufacturers "are not
insurers ... for the mistakes or carelessness of consumers who should know of
the dangers involved."" In this regard, the Johnson court felt the sophisticated
user defense would mitigate the danger of over-warning consumers, thereby
ensuring that warnings would best promote user safety."
While the court's articulation of the defense and the three reasons offered for
adopting it appear straightforward, ambiguity in the court's subsequent
discussion of how the defense will operate allows for multifarious conclusions
61
regarding exactly who should be classified as a sophisticated user.
52. Id. at 911.
53. Id. at 912 ("Just as a manufacturer need not warn ordinary consumers about generally known
dangers, a manufacturer need not warn members of a trade or profession (sophisticated users) about dangers
generally known to that trade or profession.").
54. Id.
55. Id. at 914.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Finn v. G. D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1984) (quoting Twerski et al., The Use
and Abuse of Warnings in Products-Liability - Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
495, 521 (1976))).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See generally id. (adopting the sophisticated user defense in California without clearly specifying
which model of the defense will apply).
425
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B. Inconsistency in the Court's Opinion
While Johnson does not express an outright intent to limit the doctrine to
professionals, there is language in the opinion suggesting that this is precisely
what the court intended.62 While reviewing origins of the defense, the court
discusses how other jurisdictions interpreted subdivision (b) to mean
manufacturers who reasonably believe the user will know or should know about a
product's risk do not have to provide these users with a warning.63 The court
found that "[t]his is 'especially [true] when the user is a professional who should
be aware of the characteristics of the product."' This is ambiguous because the
court insinuates that while application of the defense is especially appropriate
when the plaintiff is a professional, application of the defense will not be limited
to that specific scenario.
Next, the court identified a narrower, more exclusive approach when
characterizing the defense as "the exception to the principle that consumers
generally lack knowledge about certain products" making them unaware of the
product's potential danger. More specifically, the court defined this exception as
being applicable to "those individuals or members of professions who do know or
should know about the product's potential dangers, that is, sophisticated users,
[to whom] the dangers should be obvious, and [to whom] the defense should
apply."" There is little clarity for whether the court meant individuals of a
profession or individuals as in laypersons who are not employed in professional
or certified capacities. Similar to how manufacturers are not required to warn
ordinary consumers of commonly recognized dangers, the court stated, "a
manufacturer need not warn members of a trade or profession (sophisticated
users) about dangers generally known to that trade or profession."6  This
language provides a strong basis for arguing the court intended a more exclusive
application of the defense.
Subsequent statements in the opinion create further confusion regarding
whether the court intended a more exclusive or more inclusive application of the
defense.6 For example, the court's reference to "training manuals,... [the study
of] the information in those materials," or the undertaking of classes suggests
the plaintiff must have undergone (or been required to complete) some sort of
educational employment training for the defense to apply, such as Johnson's
62. Id. (adopting the sophisticated user defense in California without clearly specifying which model of
the defense will apply).
63. Id. at 911.
64. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th
Cir. 1981)).
65. Id. at 912.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. generally (adopting the sophisticated user defense without specifying which model applies).
69. Id. at 914.
426
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universal certification from the EPA.70 Similarly, the court stated, "[t]he focus of
the defense . .. is whether the danger in question was so generally known within
the trade or profession that a manufacturer should not have been expected to
provide a warning specific to the group to which the plaintiff belonged."7' The
court provided further support for an exclusive interpretation by finding that
individuals representing themselves as being trained in a particular field or as
"members of a sophisticated group of users" should be held to possessing the
corresponding level of training associated with that class regardless of the
knowledge he or she actually possesses.7
Towards the end of the opinion, the court swayed toward an inclusive
interpretation by affirming the court of appeal's understanding of the defense as
eliminating manufacturers' duty to warn users of an "expected user population"
who should generally be aware of the product's inherent dangers." The phrase
''expected user population" is far more inclusive than the court's earlier reference
to members of a "trade or profession," creating significant uncertainty regarding
to whom the defense will apply.74
IV. IN SEARCH OF A SUITABLE STANDARD
In light of the uncertainty regarding how the sophisticated user defense will
apply in California, a survey of how other jurisdictions apply this defense may
illuminate how the defense could potentially develop in California post-Johnson.
In adopting the defense, each jurisdiction has augmented comment k7' by
weaving in different elements to determine whether the plaintiff is a sophisticated
user.76 The following subsections will provide a sampling of four approaches that
courts have employed to assist them in defining user sophistication.
A. The "Should Have Known" Model
The "should have known" model dictates that a manufacturer need not warn
a sophisticated user of the dangers he or she knows or should have known." A
unique attribute of this defense is that even if the plaintiff did not have actual
knowledge of the danger, the plaintiff may still be classified as a sophisticated
user.7 1 In essence, the manufacturer is allowed to rely on the user's professional
70. Id. at 908.
71. Id. at 915 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 914.
73. Id. at 916.
74. Id.
75. See supra Part H (providing an overview of the origins of the sophisticated user doctrine.).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
77. Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 1976).
78. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1163 (2009) (discussing the professional considerations
model of the sophisticated user defense).
427
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experience and make assumptions about the user's expertise." Thus, the "should
have known" model defines comment k's reference to "special experience" as an
objective body of knowledge within a trade or profession.o
In Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., the plaintiff
Bradco, a company engaged in exploratory drilling, claimed it had to abandon
one of its wells because Youngstown's product, P-105 high-strength tubing, was
unreasonably hazardous for its intended purpose." When the tubing fractured,
Bradco was forced to abandon the drilling expedition8 2 and argued Youngstown
had a duty to warn that the tubing could be dangerous even when exposed to only
trace quantities of hydrogen sulfide." In Louisiana, the 'smell test' was the
accepted method for detecting hydrogen sulfide, which dictates that if one does
not smell hydrogen sulfide, no further test is conducted to determine its
presence.84 However, even undetectable traces of hydrogen sulfide can lead to
embrittlement of the P- 105 tubing.85 The ultimate issue before the court,
therefore, was "whether Youngstown had a duty to provide a double warning,
i.e., that P-105 tubing was unsafe for use in a [hydrogen sulfide] environment and
that the 'smell test' was an inadequate means to assure safe use."
Based on expert testimony regarding the oil and gas industry's awareness of
the dangers of hydrogen sulfide, 87 the court concluded the plaintiffs status as an
experienced oil and gas producer charged it with the knowledge that, despite the
absence of hydrogen sulfide odor, P-105 tubing may still be weakened from trace
amounts of the chemical. The court relied on publications previously circulated
in the industry discussing the problem and the American Petroleum Institute's
advisory warning to conduct pre-tests for possible corrosive substances.
Notwithstanding industry warnings and previously circulated publications,
Bradco claimed to be unaware of the specific shortcomings of the "smell test".9
The court dismissed this argument and held that Youngstown had no duty to
provide any warning beyond what was commonly known in the industry.9 ' This is
79. Id.
80. See generally Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d 501 (applying the "should have known" model of the
sophisticated user defense).
81. Id. at 503 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying the "should have known" model of the sophisticated user
defense); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, cmt. k (1965) (providing the foundation for the
sophisticated user doctrine).
82. Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d at 503.
83. Id. Hydrogen sulfide is an asphyxiant that can cause moderate to severe respiratory irritations or
death depending on the level of exposure. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 504.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
428
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an excellent illustration of the broad inclusiveness of the "should have known"
standard.9
B. The Professional Considerations Model
This model of the sophisticated user defense is premised on the idea that
experienced professionals who deal exclusively with certain products are more
likely to know about potential danger than the average consumer.3 Application of
the professional considerations model is extremely similar to the "should have
known" standard; the only difference is that the court focuses on whether the
danger is something the plaintiff knew or should have known by virtue of her
membership in a certain profession or trade. 94 Jurisdictions employing this model
interpret comment k's "special experience" as indicating some sort of
professional training or certification, providing a bright line test for determining
whether the plaintiff is a sophisticated user.9
In Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., the plaintiff, who worked for an
electronic company, frequently used an electrical resin named Scotchast Resin
No. 5 (Scotchcast), manufactured by 3M.9 The plaintiff filed suit after accidently
spilling Scotchcast and absentmindedly wiping her face before washing her
hands.97 Despite following the proper procedures for cleaning an affected area,
the exposure resulted in a severe chemical bum that required several skin grafts.98
The plaintiff claimed 3M failed to warn her fully of the potential dangers of
Scotchcast."
The court focused on the sophisticated user defense-noting the doctrine
"has been applied only to professionals and skilled tradespeople"'-and held
the plaintiff did not fall within this group because she had only worked as an
assembler for ten months.'o' Despite the defendant's assertion that this period of
time was sufficient to provide requisite familiarity with Scotchcast and its
potential dangers, the court concluded that the sophisticated user doctrine has not
92. Id.
93. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1163 (2009) (discussing the professional considerations
model of the sophisticated user defense).
94. Id. § 1163.
95. Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1980).
96. Id. at 242.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 244. However, if the court is unable to determine as a matter of law that the plaintiff is a
professional who also possesses actual knowledge of the danger, the court will allow the jury to determine if the
manufacturer's duty to warn was negated because the plaintiff nevertheless possessed actual knowledge of the
danger. Id.
100. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 244.
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2011 / User Defense in California Post-Johnson
been applied to laypersons, even when they have some familiarity with the
product.' 0
This case demonstrates how difficult it will be for defendants to assert the
sophisticated user defense absent clear proof that the plaintiff is a professional or
member of a trade.'03 For example, the defendant demonstrated that the plaintiffs
supervisor warned her about what would happen if the chemical touched her
skin, and that the plaintiff had prior encounters with the toxic effects of
Scotchcast, receiving medical attention during each of these prior incidents."''
Perhaps even more probative was the plaintiffs admission that she read the
warning label on the Scotchcast container.10 Based on this determination, the
court was unable to hold that the plaintiff was a sophisticated user as a matter of
law.'06
Another unique consequence of applying the professional considerations
model is its propensity for alleviating a manufacturer's duty to warn the end user
where the plaintiff's employer was the direct purchaser of the product."" Because
the manufacturer's ability to communicate with the end user is limited, the duty
to warn is nullified by placing the burden of delivery on the employer who has
direct contact with the end user.' 8
In Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., the plaintiff sued the defendant
manufacturer for failing to warn him of the dangers from inhaling silica sand
particles."'9 The court discussed the sophisticated user defense and reasoned that
situating the duty to warn with the purchaser-employer allows that party, who is
more familiar with how employees will use the product, to determine which
warnings are most relevant for that particular employee."o Because the employer
was a professional with significant experience and knowledge regarding the
dangers of silica dust inhalation (including information on how to protect against
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Ryntz v. Afrimet Indussa, Inc., 887 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant cobalt
suppliers had no duty to warn employee of product hazards when employer was a sophisticated user with full
knowledge of product's dangerous propensities); Cook v. Branick Mfg., Inc., 736 F.2d 1442, 1446 (11th Cir.
1984) ("[Wlhenever a third party has a duty to warn of a dangerous condition in the workplace that duty is
discharged by informing the employer of the dangerous condition-warning to each of the employer's
individual employees ... then becomes the responsibility of the employer."); see also Kenneth M. Willner,
Failures to Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense, 74 VA. L. REv. 579, 580 (1988) (arguing that removing
the manufacturer's duty to warn the end user and relying instead on the purchasing-chain to deliver warnings is
a more effective way to ensure that the right warning will reach the right user of the product).
108. See Willner, supra note 107 (arguing that removing the manufacturer's duty to warn the end user
and relying instead on the purchasing-chain to deliver warnings is a more effective way to ensure that the right
warning will reach the right user of the product).
109. 2003 WI App 192, 669 N.W.2d 737, 739 (noting that inhaling silica sand particles can lead to the
development of silicosis).
110. Id. at 743-44.
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those dangers), the court ruled in favor of the defendant."' For example, the
employer had been operating for over 120 years, its members belonged to the
American Foundrymen's Society, and two former safety directors testified they
would classify the employer as a technologically advanced, well-informed
member of the industry who diligently followed industry standards and
government regulations." 2 Based on the plaintiffs experience and failure to heed
the defendant's warnings, the court concluded the defendant had no duty to warn
the plaintiff directly."'
C. The Targeted Marketing Model
This unique two-pronged approach shifts focus away from the plaintiffs
classification and instead focuses on the manufacturer's marketing practices."4
Essentially, the court asks a threshold question before determining whether the
plaintiff is a sophisticated user: is the product marketed to professionals who
have experience in using that product, or is the product marketed to the "man-in-
the-street?""' If the court determines that the product is marketed to the "man-in-
the-street," manufacturers are no longer afforded the luxury of assuming that
individuals who use their products will know how to use it safely."'6 The main
rationale for applying this two-pronged approach is that the adequacy of a
warning "cannot be evaluated apart from the knowledge and expertise of those
who may reasonably be expected to use or otherwise come into contact with the
product as it proceeds along its intended marketing chain.""' Therefore, this
model responds to the ambiguity of comment k by defining "special experience"
from the point of view of the manufacturer, not the plaintiff."'
An illustration of how the court applies the "man-in-the-street" prong can be
found in Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc."' Here, the plaintiff was deep-
sea fishing when his Robalo R-236 motorboat capsized because the bilge plug
either fell out or was left open causing the bilge to fill with water.120 The R-236
was widely known for being extremely safe and for having special drain holes
that allowed water to drain from the boat when it moved forward at a slow speed,
thus providing a "self-bailing" mechanism.121
111. Id. at 745.
112. Id. at 740-41.
113. Id. at 745.
114. Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1976).
115. Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984).
116. Id. at 339.
117. Martinez, 529 F.2d at 465-66.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §388, cmt. k (1965).
119. 727 F.2d 330.
120. Id. at 333. "The bilge is the space between the double bottoms of a boat. In the Robalo 236 this
space was empty." Id. at n.3.
121. Id.
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Prior to the plaintiffs purchase of his Robalo R-236, the company merged
with the defendant, another boat manufacturer. 2 2 In subsequent production, the
R-236 no longer included a fully-foamed hull or an automatic bilge pump.123 The
hollow bilge space "meant that, unlike all other Robalos, the R-236 was not
completely self-bailing," as the only way to remove water was by manually
engaging the bilge pump.'2 Neither the dealers who sold the boat to the plaintiff
nor the owner's manual explained that the bilge plug was capable of falling out
accidentally or of the dangers that could result from water entering the bilge
125
space.
The Texas Court of Appeal concluded the defendant improperly assumed
that a reasonably prudent boater would have known the dangers of operating a
boat in the ocean while the bilge space was open.126 Because the defendant
marketed these boats to the general public, the court reasoned that users might
not know that bilge plugs can fall out while at sea or that there was no flood-
warning.' In sum, this case demonstrates how a manufacturer's duty to warn is
much more significant under the "man-in-the-street" prong of the analysis.
Alternatively, if the court determines a product is marketed to professionals,
the defendant manufacturer is allowed to assert the sophisticated user defense. 2 1
For example, in Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., the court found that the
defendant was allowed to use the sophisticated user defense because the product
was marketed to professionals.129 The plaintiff, a shore-based barge worker, was
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. However, if the bilge space filled with water, the bilge pump batteries could also become
flooded, which was what happened to the plaintiff and his shipmates. At this point, it would be too dangerous
for the boat operator to open the bilge to determine why water was entering the bilge or to replace the bilge
drain plug. Id.
125. Id. at 335-36.
[NJor does [the manual] mention that the R-236 has a void bilge space, a bilge drain and a bilge
drain plug. It does not indicate that the bilge drain plug could come off accidentally; it does not say
how an operator is supposed to be aware of the bilge filling with water; it does not state that when
water appears on deck in the rear of the cockpit it could well mean that the bilge is flooded and that
in consequence the electrical system, including the bilge pump, is in immediate danger of failing and
that the engines may shortly fail as well. Nor does it note that replacing the bilge drain plug when the
bilge is full of water is a very difficult and hazardous procedure.
Id. at 335.
126. Id. at 339.
127. Id. In assessing the applicability of the sophisticated user defense, the court determined the
defendant marketed the R-236 to the general public based on the fact that the defendant did not impose any
restrictions on the sale of the R-236, making it available to even a novice boatman. Id.
128. Id. at 338-39
Where, for example, a product is marketed solely to professionals experienced in using the product,
the manufacturer may rely on the knowledge which a reasonable professional would apply in using
the product. Where, however, the product is marketed to the general public, the manufacturer must
tailor the warning to the man-in-the-street.
Id.
129. Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 1976).
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overcome by noxious fumes while stripping a barge that formerly transported
Hytrol-D, a petrochemical mixture containing benzene."' The defendant
chemical manufacturer employed several warning mechanisms, including a
Benzene Warning and Cargo Information Card provided by the Manufacturing
Chemists Association, which were placed on the barge along with a product
identification card to accompany the shipment."3
Applying Texas law, the court determined the defendant was not liable for
failing to warn the plaintiff of dangers associated with Hytrol-D because the
defendant only marketed the product to "industrial users who utilized it in the
manufacture of gasoline" and because there was absolutely no evidence that
Hytrol-D was to "be sold to or used by the general consuming public.""'
Additionally, the plaintiff was an experienced professional, justifying the
defendant's assumption that its warnings need only be sufficient to warn a
professional about the potential danger of its products.133 This case demonstrates
how the court's initial determination of whether the product is marketed to
laypersons or professionals has drastic implications for the success of the
plaintiffs claim.'3
D. The Familiarity Model
Similar to the actual knowledge standard, the familiarity standard evaluates
whether the plaintiff had any firsthand experience with the product to alert him or
her to the danger that caused the injury.135 In contrast with other models of the
defense, jurisdictions proscribing to the familiarity model have declined to
formulate a clear-cut definition for "special experience," considering the
plaintiffs potential sophistication on a free-flowing spectrum.16 For example, in
130. Id.
131. Id. at 462.
This warning card displayed two red skull and crossbones insignias, indicated that only properly
protected and authorized personnel should be used to effect cargo transfer, detailed a variety of
hazards including the harmfulness of the chemical's vapors, and provided instructions for handling
various possible accident or emergency situations. The benzene warning card was selected because
specific Coast Guard instructions required that Hytrol-D be classified and regulated as benzene
while in marine transit. DuPont maintains that in addition to these two warnings, one of its
employees placed a product identification card in the barge's 'tube'-a special compartment on the
barge which was the normal repository of such documents and was designed to keep them out of the
weather.
Id.
132. Id. at 463.
133. Id. at 465. Given the highly technical nature of barge stripping and the tank cleaning trade, the
plaintiff had been as a shore tank cleaner for at least eight years. Id.
134. See id. at 465-66 (determining plaintiff was a sophisticated benzene user based on his professional
experience as a barge stripper).
135. Daniel J. Herling & Leyla Mujkic, CA Adopts the Sophisticated User Doctrine, 27 No. I LJN's
PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY 3 (2008).
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 388, cmt k (1965).
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Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., the plaintiff, an avid gun user, alleged the
defendant failed to warn him that the safest way to store gunpowder is in a
wooden box. 1 After converting a room in his home into a gun-storage and
reloading station, the plaintiff was injured while loading cartridges into one of his
rifles.' The rifle was positioned on a loading bench with the muzzle pointed six
to eight inches from storage containers full of gunpowder."9 When the plaintiff
finished, he closed the bolt, which caused the gun to fire and trigger a chain-
reaction inside the small room, severely burning the plaintiff."o
In analyzing the plaintiffs failure to warn claim, the court first stated that
manufacturers have "a duty to provide an adequate warning of any danger
inherent in the normal use of its product which is not within the knowledge of or
obvious to the ordinary user." 4' However, the court reasoned that manufacturers
are not required to warn about dangers that would be obvious to the ordinary
user, especially when he or she is a sophisticated user who has familiarity with
the product.142 The plaintiffs significant familiarity with guns should have alerted
him to the fact that "any barrier, such as wood, would provide additional
protection and make storage of the powder safer." 43 Therefore, the court
concluded the plaintiff was a sophisticated user who should be well aware that,
despite its name, smokeless gunpowder is highly flammable.'" Based on this
finding, the court allowed the manufacturer to assert the sophisticated user
defense. "
V. PLOTTING A COURSE FOR CALIFORNIA
In considering the most suitable approach for California, each model of the
defense should be assessed through the individual lenses of Johnson's policy
reasons: the causation theory, section 388 of the Restatement, and the desire to
ensure the optimal effectiveness of warnings.'" While no single approach fully
achieves all three goals articulated in Johnson, the familiarity approach addresses
these concerns most completely and is, therefore, the most attractive evolutionary
path for the sophisticated user doctrine in California.
137. Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 1218/94); 648 So. 2d 331, 334.
138. Id. at 333. The room included supplies for modifying and loading cartridges, "a reloading bench,
several reloading manuals, presses, dies, shells, loaded cartridges, primers[,]" and thirty-seven containers of
various brands of smokeless gunpowder, which were located on the back of the reloading bench. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 337.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 338.
144. Id. at 336.
145. Id. at 338.
146. See Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905 (Cal. 2008) (discussing reasons the California
Supreme Court chose to adopt the sophisticated user defense).
434
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 42
A. Prior Notice & the Causation Theory
First, Johnson reasoned that failure to warn a user about known risks is
usually not the proximate cause of a sophisticated user's injuries resulting from
those risks-in effect, such awareness constitutes prior notice of the danger.147
Therefore, the ideal approach for California should incorporate some analysis of
the plaintiff's subjective knowledge of the danger.
The "should have known" model provides little assistance for singling out
plaintiffs with prior notice of the product danger.148 More specifically, this model
of the defense is highly inclusive and makes no incorporation of the plaintiffs
subjective understanding of the product danger.149 The fractured tubing incident
in Bradco Oil & Gas, Co. is a perfect example of this concept,5 o demonstrating
how some plaintiffs will be charged with prior notice of the danger despite a
complete lack of awareness, which is completely contradictory to the first goal of
Johnson."'
The professional considerations model presents similar difficulties, often
negating a manufacturer's duty to warn because knowledge is imputed to a
plaintiff based on membership with a trade or profession, regardless of whether
there was actual awareness.' Conversely, this model of the defense yields
counterproductive results when the user possesses actual knowledge of the
danger and the defendant is nevertheless barred from asserting the defense
because the plaintiff is not a certified professional."' Additionally, cases litigated
under this model of the defense often turn entirely on expert testimony regarding
what a professional might have known about the danger in question. ' This
emphasis on expert testimony detracts from analyzing the plaintiffs actual prior
knowledge of the danger.'" Ultimately, limiting application of the defense to
147. Id. at 911 (quoting Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. 623 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1980)).
148. See id. (discussing the relevance of whether the plaintiff was a professional in determining user
sophistication).
149. Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1976).
150. Id.
151. Johnson, 179 P.3d 905 (quoting Billiar., 623 F.2d at 243). The first goal of the Johnson court is
preventing those users who had prior notice of the harm from alleging that the manufacturer's lack of warning
was the cause of his or her injury. Id.
152. See Guarascio v. Drake Associates Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding the plaintiff
was a sophisticated user of oxygen manifold breathing apparatus despite unawareness that modifying the
location of the valves could cause them to shut off, thereby depriving the diver of oxygen); Bradco Oil & Gas
Co, 532 F.2d at 504 (where a professional oil and gas producer was charged with knowledge about inadequacy
of commonly-used "smell test" based on its status as a member of the oil and gas producers industry); Emory v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 148 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding the Navy's lack of actual knowledge of
danger was irrelevant because a reasonable person in the Navy's position is assumed to be aware of the danger).
153. See Billiar, 623 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1980) (determining as a matter of law that the plaintiff was not a
professional, thereby precluding the defendant from asserting the sophisticated user defense, but allowing the
jury to determine whether the plaintiff nevertheless had sufficient knowledge of the danger).
154. Guarascio, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
155. See id. (relying entirely on professional testimony to determine that the plaintiff was a sophisticated
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professionals will prevent those plaintiffs who have prior notice of the danger
from being classified as sophisticated users based on a minor technicality, i.e.
that they are not certified professionals.'
Similarly, the first prong' of the targeted marketing approach fails to
account for those members of the general public who may have significant
experience with the product despite not belonging to a profession or trade, and
who do not require a warning because of this prior knowledge." Conversely, if
the plaintiff is considered more sophisticated than the "man-in-the-street," (or the
cyclist-on-the-road in Matherne's case) he or she will be charged with the
knowledge and expertise in that general field."9 In this regard, the second prong'6
mirrors the "should have known" standard, in that it may charge an unknowing
plaintiff with actual knowledge of the danger."' While this approach may help to
identify those plaintiffs with prior notice of the danger, it is flawed because the
body of prior knowledge chargeable to the plaintiff turns on the manufacturer's
marketing practices, not on the plaintiff's comprehension of the danger.16
Ultimately, the familiarity approach is the best model for accomplishing
Johnson's goal to prevent users with prior knowledge of a product's potential
dangers from asserting a failure to warn claim against the manufacturer.' This
approach offers a flexible framework that is unencumbered by arbitrary labels or
prongs.'" Instead, this model focuses on whether the plaintiff possesses a
significant degree of knowledge regarding the danger based on his or her
personal experience with the product.'65 This demonstrates that-regardless of
how the product is marketed or whether the plaintiff is a professional-the court
will be able to assess the user's familiarity with the danger.'6 While this
user, and that the manufacturer had no duty to warn him of the danger of altering commercial dive gear).
156. See Billiar, 623 F.2d at 243 (noting that despite plaintiffs testimony that she had read the warning
label and was aware of the danger of coming into contact with the harmful chemical, the court held that she was
not a sophisticated user based on her status as a layperson).
157. See supra Part IV.C (describing the two prongs of the targeted marketing approach to the
sophisticated user doctrine).
158. See Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331 (holding that the
plaintiff was a sophisticated user based on his extensive recreational use of guns).
159. Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984).
160. See supra Part IV.C (describing the two prongs of the targeted marketing approach to the
sophisticated user doctrine).
161. Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 911 (Cal. 2008) (quoting Billiar, 623 F.2d at
243).
162. See Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338-39 (describing the two prongs of the targeted marketing approach
and how plaintiffs are analyzed under either prong based solely on the manufacturer's marketing practices).
163. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 911 (quoting Billiar, 623 F.2d at 243).
164. See Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 330 (describing the two prongs of the targeted marketing approach and
how plaintiffs are analyzed under either prong based solely on the manufacturer's marketing practices).
165. See Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331, 336 (holding that
the plaintiff was a sophisticated user based on his extensive recreational use of guns).
166. See Henrie v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 502 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting professional
painter testified that he was aware of the danger in removing the holding pins of glass fixture without adequate
man power to control the device and was not allowed to claim the manufacturer failed to warn him of the
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approach may not be able to isolate only those users with prior notice of a
specific danger, it creates a reasonable sphere that includes the users who are
most likely to know about the danger by virtue of their experience, as opposed to
their occupation or consumer status.
B. Section 388 & Elevated Obviousness
Commentators note that the sophisticated user doctrine is intended to identify
those individuals whose understanding of a product's potential dangers is more
elevated than the general public's.' In turn, Johnson relied on section 388 for the
proposition that some product dangers may be more obvious to sophisticated
users than to the average layperson, thereby negating the manufacturer's duty to
warn those sophisticated users.' Based on this assertion, the best model for
accomplishing this goal will incorporate an analysis of whether the plaintiffs
ability to appreciate a given product's danger is greater than the general public's.
The "should have known" model is ill-suited for accomplishing this goal
because it focuses on the objective information available to a particular industry,
as opposed to focusing on the whether the plaintiffs appreciation of the danger
was greater than the general public' s.o70 Because of this focus, it will be
extremely difficult to predict which industry practices the courts will include in
the analysis. 7 ' Further, given that this approach allows manufacturers to make
assumptions about the user's expertise, it will also be difficult to ensure that
manufacturers are making similar assumptions about the same class of users.172
This is insufficient in light of Johnson's goal to focus on whether the plaintiff had
an elevated appreciation of the danger, not what is commonly known in a specific
industry.17 3
dangers of such action).
167. See generally Hines, 648 So.2d at 338 (determining the plaintiffs familiarity with guns provided
him with enough knowledge to know that storing gun powder in certain boxes would be more safe than in
others).
168. Douglas R. Richmond, Products Liability: Corporate Successors and the Duty to Warn, 45
BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 547-48 (1993).
169. Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 912 (Cal. 2008) ("Just as a manufacturer need
not warn ordinary consumers about generally known dangers, a manufacturer need not warn members of a trade
or profession (sophisticated users) about dangers generally known to that trade or profession.").
170. See Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 1976)
(discussing the accepted standards and level of information common in the oil and gas production industry
when determining whether the plaintiff was a sophisticated user).
171. See id. (charging plaintiff with knowledge that the 'smell test' for detecting dangerous chemical
was inadequate, despite expert testimony that it was used widely in the oil and gas production industry).
172. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1163 (2009) (discussing the professional considerations
model of the sophisticated user defense).
173. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 912 ("Just as a manufacturer need not warn ordinary consumers about
generally known dangers, a manufacturer need not warn members of a trade or profession (sophisticated users)
about dangers generally known to that trade or profession.").
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Similarly, the professional considerations approach does not embrace
Johnson's second objective.174 Limiting the assertion of the sophisticated user
defense to professionals undermines the second objective by failing to account
for those plaintiffs, such as the plaintiff in Hines, who have special experience
with the product despite their status as laypersons. 7 Therefore, the professional
considerations approach is unsuitable for accomplishing the second objective
because individuals who have significant experience with the product may escape
classification as a sophisticated user based on the mere technicality that they are
laypersons.16
It should be noted, however, that one attractive feature of the professional
considerations approach is that professionals often undergo significant
educational or training courses before becoming employed. 7 ' These employers,
similar to the one in Haase, often dedicate significant time and resources to
ensure their employees are kept abreast of the most current industry standards
and government safety regulations.'7 ' These measures will inevitably provide
employees with an increased understanding of the dangers that they may
encounter. 79
Moving on, the targeted marketing approach initially appears calibrated for
differentiating between individuals with an elevated awareness of the danger due
to their experience with the product compared to individuals who lack any
experience whatsoever. However, this approach falls short of accomplishing the
second objective in that it focuses entirely on the manufacturer's marketing
practices without conducting any analysis of whether the plaintiff had an elevated
sense of the danger.so The first prong of the defense comes closer than the
previously discussed approaches to accomplishing the second objective in that it
174. See supra Part lI.A.
175. For example, if Hines had adopted the professional considerations standard instead of the
familiarity standard, the sophisticated user would be inapplicable defense because the defendant would have
been unable to show the plaintiff was a professional gun user. However, it is evident that Hines did in fact have
significant experience than general public. See Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648
So. 2d 331, 338 (discussing application of the familiarity standard of the sophisticated user doctrine).
176. Id. But see Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1980). Despite ten
months experience applying Scotchcast, the plaintiff was not a sophisticated user because of her status as a
layperson, not a professional. Id. However, under the professional considerations approach, the court gave little
deference to the amount of knowledge and experience the plaintiff had with the product. Id. Surely, the plaintiff
in Billiar knew far more about the dangers of Scotchcast and how to handle it properly than the general public
given the specialized and technical purpose for which Scotchcast was used.
177. See Henrie v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 502 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting plaintiff had
undergone several rounds of educational training regarding use of fixtures); Johnson, 179 P.3d at 912 (noting
plaintiff was a professional HVAC technician who had completed several certification courses and educational
courses).
178. Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2003 WI App 192, 669 N.W.2d 737,744.
179. See Douglas R. Richmond, Renewed Look at the Duty to Warn and Affirmative Defenses, 61 DEF.
CouNs. J. 205, 211 (1994) (stating that a sophisticated user's experience gives him or her a significantly greater
appreciation of the product's danger compared to the general public).
180. See Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing both
prongs of the targeted marketing approach).
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allows the manufacturer to take advantage of the increased awareness that some
users may possess based on their profession or trade, and to tailor the product's
warnings accordingly.'' However, under the stricter, "man-in-the-street" prong
of the targeted marketing approach, the manufacturer is not able to make any
assumptions about what the product user may know, thus making the
manufacturer's duty to warn far more substantial.'82
The familiarity approach offers the most effective method for identifying
individuals with an elevated awareness of the product's danger.183 As illustrated
in Hines, analyzing the user's familiarity with the product-as opposed to the
manufacturer's marketing practices or the plaintiff s occupation-renders a wider
array of plaintiffs, such as hobbyists and recreationalists, capable of classification
as sophisticated users.'" In concluding that manufacturers are not required to
warn about dangers that would be obvious to a user who is familiar with the
product, Hines was able to account for the elevated sense of awareness that
sophisticated users of a certain product will have.' The familiarity approach may
be viewed as a more restrained formulation of the "should have known" standard,
in that it will charge the plaintiff with an objective body of knowledge, but only
in proportion to how much experience the plaintiff has with the product in
question.' Accordingly, the familiarity approach encompasses those plaintiffs
whose occupational training has provided them with a greater appreciation of the
product's danger.17
181. See Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that DuPont's
marketing practices justified the assumption that "the warnings need only be sufficient to warn a professional
about the potential danger of its products").
182. See Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338-39 (discussing the "man-in-the-street" prong of the targeted
marketing approach).
183. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the familiarity approach to the sophisticated user doctrine).
184. See Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331, 338 (discussing the
application of the sophisticated user defense to any plaintiff who is familiar with the product that caused the
plaintiff's harm).
185. Id. (Had Billiar applied the familiarity approach instead of the professional considerations model,
the court might have held the plaintiff was a sophisticated user based on her extensive use of the product,
injuries sustained from it, and her testimony that she knew the product was harmful).
186. Compare Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir.
1976) (discussing application of the "should have known" standard), with Hines, 648 So. 2d at, 337 (discussing
the application of the sophisticated user defense to any plaintiff who is familiar with the product that caused the
plaintiff's harm).
187. See Henrie v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 502 F.3d 1228, 12343 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting plaintiff
had undergone several rounds of educational training regarding use of fixtures); Johnson 179 P.3d at 908
(noting plaintiff was a professional HVAC technician who had completed several certification courses and
educational courses); see also Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2003 WI App 192, 669 N.W.2d 737 (indicating
that if Haase adopted the familiarity standard, Haase's substantial experience with silica sand might have led
the court to conclude that he was a sophisticated user).
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C. Over-Warning & the Reduction of Liability Exposure
In Johnson, the California Supreme Court reasoned the sophisticated user
defense would curb the adverse effects of over-warning.'" The court also
concluded that it would prevent manufacturers from becoming the insurers of
those individuals injured as a result of their own mistake as opposed to the
manufacturer's failure to provide a warning.'" Therefore, California's ideal
model should restrict the amount of warnings a manufacturer must include with
their products while simultaneously shifting some responsibility for using proper
safety techniques to the user.'"
Above all, the "should have known" standard is the best model for limiting
manufacturers' liability because it enables manufacturers to rely on each industry
to disseminate safety information, which is in line with the job-related
obligations of employers and employees to keep informed of dangerous or
hazardous products.'9 ' Because this standard places such a significant emphasis
on the common knowledge within an industry, manufacturers can forgo including
warnings for every possible danger a user may encounter, thereby increasing
their overall effectiveness.192 In this regard, the "should have known" model
provides manufacturers the most deference and takes the greatest strides towards
reducing their liability exposure.
The "should have known" standard also offers the most effective method for
weeding out plaintiffs who were harmed as a result of their own carelessness or
mistake.'93 Imposing an objective body of knowledge on a potentially unknowing
plaintiff will create an incentive for plaintiffs to stay informed about the most
recent developments in their field or industry, as they will be held accountable to
the accepted body of industry knowledge either way.94
188. 179 P.3d at 914 (quoting Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1984); Twerski et al., The
Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products-Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
495, 521 (1976)).
189. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 914
190. Id. (adopting the sophisticated user defense in order to limit manufacturer's liability and weed out
those plaintiffs who are able to identify the danger without warnings from the manufacturer).
191. See Willner, supra note 108 (arguing that removing the manufacturer's duty to warn the end user
and relying instead on the purchasing-chain to deliver warnings is a more effective way to ensure that the right
warning will reach the right user of the product).
192. See Rebecca Korzec, Restating the Obvious in Maryland Products Liability Law: The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability and Failure to Warn Defenses, 30 U. BALT. L. REv. 341 (2001) (discussing
the tendency of manufacturers to include an abundance of warnings when the jurisdiction does not allow them
to rely on the objective knowledge attributable to the product user through the sophisticated user defense). For
example, the Bradco court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs professed lack of awareness and held "the
defendant was not required to give [the plaintiff] any information in addition to that generally known in the
industry to protect against use under adverse well conditions of which [the plaintiff] ... should have been
aware." Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d at 504.
193. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 914.
194. Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d at 504.
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Despite these advantages, this standard will most often apply to professionals
or highly trained individuals because the court will look to a particular industry
or trade to define the appropriate objective body of knowledge.'5 This may not
be inclusive enough in that some individuals with substantial product experience
will escape classification as a sophisticated user if they do not belong to an
industry or trade.'96 Therefore, if California truly wants to limit manufacturers'
liability exposure, the "should have known" standard is the best choice. 97
Alternatively, the professional considerations model will achieve Johnson's
third goal because manufacturers will be able to rely on the employer to provide
the employees with the appropriate warnings.'" More specifically, situating the
duty to warn with the purchaser-employer allows the party who is more familiar
with how the product will be used to determine what safety information is
relevant.'" However, limiting a manufacturer's ability to rely on the knowledge
of the professional product user still exposes the manufacturer to significant
liability from non-professionals who use their products.2" While attractive in
some respects, this approach does not afford manufacturers as much liability
protection as the "should have known" standard.20'
The targeted marketing approach seems to offer a method for achieving
Johnson's third goal because it acknowledges that the average user demographic
is not the same for every product.202 It also acknowledges that the types of
warnings provided should be directly correlated to the members in the specific
class of individuals who will use the product.2 03 This distinction between
laypersons and sophisticated users ensures that the correct warning will reach the
appropriate user, which prevents the negative result of over-warning.2" This two-
195. Id.
196. See generally Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing
limitation of the sophisticated user defense to tradespeople or professionals only).
197. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 914.
198. See Willner, supra note 108 (arguing that removing the manufacturer's duty to warn the end user
and relying instead on the purchasing-chain to deliver warnings is a more effective way to ensure that the right
warning will reach the right user of the product).
199. Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2003 WI App 192, 669 N.W.2d 737, 744. For example, in Haase,
one of the former safety experts who worked at Neenah Foundry testified the company did not rely on the
supplier for instructions on how to handle silica sand properly. Id.
200. See Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331, 338 (discussing the
application of the sophisticated user defense to any plaintiff who is familiar with the product that caused the
plaintiffs harm).
201. Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 1976)
202. Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 1976).
203. Id.
204. Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 914 (Cal. 2008) (quoting Finn v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 677 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1984); Twerski et al., supra note 188, at 521. For an example of this channeling
function, compare Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 339, which determined the defendant
marketed boats to the general public and therefore should have provided more warnings about potential dangers
users, with Martinez, 529 F.2d at 466, where the defendant marketed chemicals exclusively to professionals and
therefore did not need to provide a long, overly inclusive list of warnings to the sophisticated end user.
441
2011 / User Defense in California Post-Johnson
pronged analysis remedies the aforementioned shortcomings of the professional
considerations approach by allowing non-professionals to be classified as
sophisticated users, thereby reducing manufacturers' liability exposure.205
Despite these attributes, the dual-pronged nature of the targeted marketing
approach poses a potentially threatening result: when manufacturers discover that
marketing strictly to professionals will lower the duty to warn, they may include
more warnings that say "professional use only" in order to limit their liability
despite a substantial likelihood that non-professionals will use the product.206
These skewed warnings would undermine the essential function of the product
warning system because a non-professional user may still use the product.207
Similarly, the targeted marketing approach focuses on the marketing practices of
the manufacturer without shifting any responsibility to a user who was injured
due to carelessness or by his or her own mistake.208 Such a formulaic approach
may offer some protection from significant liability exposure, but it pales in
comparison to the expansive protection available under the "should have known"
model.2 9
Under the familiarity approach, a court will place less pressure on the
manufacturer, preventing the inclusion of too many warnings that may create
consumer contempt for the warning process.2 to More specifically, Hines
establishes that manufacturers are not required to warn about dangers that would
be obvious to a user who is familiar with the product, which means that
manufacturers will not feel pressured to include an abundance of warnings.2 l A
prudent manufacturer would take steps to learn whether a particular group of
2122,Ihobbyists uses its product, such as in Hines or Pavlides213 , in order to account
for the particular warnings those users may need as opposed to providing a
laundry list of the dangers they could encounter.214 The familiarity approach may
be viewed as a more restrained formulation of the "should have known" standard
205. See Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338-39 (discussing application of the targeted marketing approach).
206. See generally Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that a
manufacturer who markets its product solely to professionals, and who includes a warning that the product is for
professional use only, will have a significantly lesser duty to warn the end user).
207. Id.
208. See generally Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338-39 (discussing application of the targeted marketing
approach).
209. Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 1976).
210. Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 914 (Cal. 2008) (quoting Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
677 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1984); Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products-Liability-Design Defect
Litigation Comes ofAge, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 521 (1976)).
211. Id. at 911 (quoting Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., Inc. 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981)).
212. See Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331, 338 (discussing the
application of the sophisticated user defense to any plaintiff who is familiar with the product that caused the
plaintiffs harm).
213. See Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338-39 (discussing the "man-in-the-street" prong of the targeted
marketing approach).
214. See Twerski et al., supra note 188, at 521 (describing research that indicates how manufacturers
can make their warnings most effective).
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because it will charge the plaintiff with an objective body of knowledge, but only
in proportion to how much experience the plaintiff has with the product in
question.215  This also allows the manufacturer to take advantage of the
professional considerations model in that those professionals with extensive
training and experience will be inherently more familiar with the products they
use on the job.216 Lastly, it addresses the perspective-based flaw of the targeted
marketing approach by placing less emphasis on the manufacturer's marketing
practices and more responsibility on individuals who have significant experience
with a product to employ proper safety methods.217
Similar to the "should have known" standard, however, the familiarity model
maintains a concern that manufacturers will be unable to identify the precise
body of knowledge attributable to the plaintiff.218 This would be even more
complicated where the professional limitation is removed and any individual
familiar with the product may be classified as a sophisticated user.2' 9 While the
"should have known" standard creates uncertainty about what is objectively
known in a particular trade or industry, the familiarity approach is even less
guided in that there could be endless possibilities for defining the objective class
to which the plaintiff belongs.2 20 Based on this uncertainty, the "should have
known" standard remains the best choice for accomplishing Johnson's third
*221
objective.
D. Recommendation
Each of the four approaches surveyed in this Comment fail to adequately
222
encompass all of the Johnson goals.22 Thus, this Comment recommends an
215. Compare Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d at 504 (discussing application of the "should have
known" standard), with Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331, 338
(discussing the application of the sophisticated user defense to any plaintiff who is familiar with the product that
caused the plaintiff's harm).
216. See Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2003 WI App 192, 669 N.W.2d 737, 743-744 (describing
application of the professional considerations model); see also Hines, 648 So.2d at 338 (discussing the
application of the sophisticated user defense to any plaintiff who is familiar with the product that caused her
harm).
217. See generally Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 339 (discussing application of the targeted marketing
approach).
218. See Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d at 503 (discussing the accepted standards and level of
information common in the oil and gas production industry when determining whether the plaintiff was a
sophisticated user).
219. Id.
220. Id. For example, in Hines, the court could have held that Hines was part of the familiar gun-users
class, or taken a more narrow approach and concluded that he was part of the familiar Hodgson's brand-users.
Hines, 648 So. 2d 331.
221. Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 914 (Cal. 2008); see also Bradco Oil & Gas
Co., 532 F.2d 501 (discussing the third objective of the Johnson court, which is preventing over-warning and
limiting manufacturers' exposure to unnecessary liability).
222. See supra Part V.A-B (evaluating which of the aforementioned models are best suited for
accomplishing each of the Johnson court's three reasons for adopting the sophisticated user defense).
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approach that comes closest to achieving all three objectives without completely
sacrificing one objective for another. Ultimately, the familiarity approach
provides the best vehicle for determining which users are most likely to have
prior notice of the danger, which users have an elevated awareness of any
potential dangers, and for limiting manufacturers' liability exposure while
simultaneously ensuring the effectiveness of warnings.223
First, the familiarity approach addresses an internal inconsistency in the
Johnson opinion. In Bradco, the court was unwilling to account for the plaintiff's
lack of actual awareness of the danger, which is identical to the Johnson court's
determination that Johnson was a sophisticated user despite his assertion that he
did not understand the dangers of heating R-22. 24 If Johnson adopted the defense
to establish that failure to warn an individual who is already sufficiently familiar
with the product cannot be the proximate cause of the danger, the court should
have given more deference to Johnson's professed unawareness of the dangers in
heating R-22.' In this regard, the familiarity approach straddles the line between
a purely subjective analysis of whether the plaintiff had prior notice of the danger
and the imposition of an objective body of knowledge or professional
limitation.226
The familiarity approach will also account for plaintiffs with an elevated
awareness of any potential dangers a product may pose.227 The extent of a given
user's familiarity is directly correlated to whether their appreciation of potential
dangers is greater than the general public' S.228 The familiarity approach is
unencumbered by labels, such as "professional" versus "non-professional," or by
a misguided focus on the marketing practices of the manufacturer.229 It is neither
too exclusive (as is the professional considerations standard) nor too inclusive (as
is the "should have known" standard), but rather, it allows for an unencumbered
analysis of the plaintiffs appreciation of the danger.230
223. See supra Parts IV.D. & V.A-C (discussing the familiarity approach generally, and then discussing
it's suitability for accomplishing the three objectives discussed by the Johnson court).
224. Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d 501; Johnson, 179 P.3d 905 (applying the "should have known"
standard of the defense).
225. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 911 (quoting Billiar v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. 623 F.2d 240, 243 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
226. Id. at 905.
227. See supra Part V.B (discussing each model's suitability for accomplishing the Johnson court's
second goal, which is identifying those users who have an elevated awareness of a product's potential danger).
228. Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 94-0455 (La. 12/8/94); 648 So. 2d 331, 338 (holding that the
plaintiffs extreme familiarity with guns provided enough basis to hold that he was a sophisticated user); see
also Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d at 501 (discussing the "should have known" model of the defense, which
focuses on an objective body of knowledge attributable to the plaintiff); Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin,
Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing application of the targeted marketing approach); Richmond,
supra note 179 (stating that a sophisticated user's experience gives them a significantly greater appreciation of
the product's danger compared to the general public).
229. See Hines, 648 So.2d at 338 (holding that the plaintiff's extreme familiarity with guns provided
enough basis to hold that he was a sophisticated user).
230. See Billiar, 623 F.2d at 243; see also Richmond, supra note 179 (stating that a sophisticated user's
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In regard to reducing manufacturers liability and preventing an
overabundance of warnings, the familiarity approach comes very close to
encompassing what the "should have known" standard accomplishes.23 1 While the
familiarity approach does not allow manufacturers to rely completely on an
objectively imposed body of knowledge, it does allow the manufacturer to make
some assumptions about what those users with significant product-experience
know about potential dangers.232 This also creates an incentive for users to
adequately educate themselves about certain products, as they still may be
charged with a more objective body of knowledge based on their familiarity.233
In sum, the familiarity approach is the best choice because it tempers the
harshness of the actual knowledge standard by casting a wider net to include
plaintiffs who may not have actual knowledge, but who nevertheless have
enough experience with the product to constitute prior notice.2 34 The familiarity
standard is unencumbered by labels, such as "professional" or "layperson," and it
only charges the plaintiff with knowledge of the danger where the plaintiffs
experience with the product provides a strong enough basis for concluding that
he had the capacity to identify the danger in question.235
VI. CONCLUSION
21
Sophistication can be defined in many ways.236 The scope of that definition
may have significant consequences for product users by alleviating manufacturer
liability for an injury involving their products.237 The comparison of how different
cases would be resolved under the various models of the defense demonstrates
experience gives them a significantly greater appreciation of the product's danger compared to the general
public).
231. See Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d at 501 (applying the "should have known" model of the
defense).
232. See supra Part IV.D. (discussing the familiarity approach).
233. See Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis
of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 38 (1983) (quoting Model Unif. Prods. Liab. Act, 44
Fed. Reg. 62, 714-15 (1979)) (discussing how removing manufacturers' duty to warn users who knew or should
have known about a product's dangers results in shifting the incentive for loss prevention to the end user, who is
the best able to accomplish that goal.) As previously mentioned, the familiarity approach may present some
issues regarding how to define the objective body of knowledge attributable to the plaintiff. See Hines, 648
So.2d at 338 (holding that the plaintiffs extreme familiarity with guns provided enough basis to hold that he
was a sophisticated user). However, using expert testimony or using the testimony of other individuals who
have similar experience with the product can remedy this problem. See Guarascio v. Drake Associates, Inc., 582
F.Supp.2d 459, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying heavily on expert testimony in determining whether the plaintiff
should have known about the danger by virtue of his profession).
234. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 233.
235. See Hines, 648 So.2d at 338 (holding that the plaintiffs extreme familiarity with guns provided
enough basis to hold that he was a sophisticated user).
236. See supra Part IV (discussing different variations of the sophisticated user defense).
237. See Matherne v. Poutrait-Morin/Zefal-Christophe, Todson, Inc., 2002-2136 (La. App. 1 Cir.
12/12/03); 868 So. 2d 114, 121 (determining that the plaintiffs recreational involvement with cycling made him
a sophisticated user of toe clips).
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how subtle nuances in definition can completely change the outcome of a case.
These subtleties should be finely calibrated through the lens of policy objectives
239the sophisticated user doctrine was adopted to accomplish.
The California Supreme Court carefully assigned three policy reasons for the
sophisticated user defense, but unfortunately, the opinion presents many
perplexing inconsistencies and thematically paradoxical perspectives on how the
doctrine should operate.o Ultimately, the familiarity approach, as demonstrated
in Hines v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., is the most suitable method for
accomplishing the Johnson objectives, as it offers the most complete solution for
identifying plaintiffs who truly are sophisticated product users and who therefore
do not require additional warnings about the dangers they may encounter. '
238. See supra Part V (discussing which of the various models of the sophisticated user defense is best
suited for accomplishing the Johnson court's three reasons for adopting the defense in California).
239. See supra Part III (providing an overview of Johnson, the ambiguity in the court's opinion, and the
three reasons that the court listed in discussing why the defense should apply in California).
240. See supra Part T.B; see also Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. 179 P.3d 905, 914 (Cal. 2008);
Bradco Oil & Gas Co., 532 F.2d 501 (discussing the third objective of the Johnson court, which is preventing
over-warning and limiting manufacturers' exposure to unnecessary liability).
241. 648 So.2d at 338.
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